Ghosts of 1945 Shape Today’s Contest Over Asia
History is never only about the past. In international politics it is constantly recruited to serve present purposes. The memory of 1945—the year that marked the end of the Second World War in Asia—has returned to the centre of great-power conversation. Recent exchanges between the United States and China, and parallel references involving Russia, show how the wartime experience is being reinterpreted to justify competing visions of order in Asia.
Selective Memory at the Highest Level
When the leaders of the United States and China met recently, they publicly recalled that the two countries had stood as allies in the victory over the Axis powers. The affirmation sounds straightforward. In reality it papers over important distinctions. The Chinese state that fought alongside the United States against Japan was the Republic of China, led by Chiang Kai-shek. That government later retreated to Taiwan, where its political continuity endures. The Communist Party that now rules the mainland was a secondary actor in the conventional war against Japan and spent much of the period engaged in its own civil conflict.
To speak of “China” as a victorious ally of 1945 without qualification therefore collapses two very different political entities into one. The elision is useful for contemporary diplomacy. It allows both Washington and Beijing to invoke a shared triumph while avoiding the awkward fact that the wartime partner of the United States is the government that still exists in Taipei.
China’s Shift from Victim to Victor
For decades after 1949, the People’s Republic emphasised China’s suffering at Japanese hands. The narrative of victimhood served domestic mobilisation and diplomatic claims. Under the current leadership the emphasis has gradually broadened. Official commemorations, military parades and educational materials now stress China’s contribution to the defeat of Japan and its place among the founding victors of the post-war international system.
This shift is not merely commemorative. It supports a larger claim to status. If China was a victor power in 1945, then it possesses an inherent right to a leading role in shaping Asia’s security order. The same memory is used to question the legitimacy of the network of US alliances constructed in the early Cold War—the so-called San Francisco system—that continues to structure security relations from Japan and South Korea to Australia. By reasserting a victor’s prerogative, Beijing seeks to relativise arrangements it regards as outdated constraints on its natural pre-eminence.
Russia and the Yalta Template
Russia, too, recruits the ghosts of 1945. Victory in the Great Patriotic War remains a central pillar of national identity and state legitimacy. In foreign policy the memory underpins claims to a privileged role in European security and nostalgia for the Yalta order, in which the wartime allies organised the post-war world through great-power consensus. References to that era serve to challenge the expansion of Western institutions and to argue that stable security requires recognition of Russia’s special interests.
When American leaders invoke wartime cooperation with Moscow, they open space for a diplomatic narrative that softens the image of permanent confrontation. Critics of such outreach worry that it unsettles allies who depend on the post-1945 transatlantic and Asian security structures. Supporters see it as realist flexibility. In either case, the past is being put to work.

Asia’s Unsettled Settlement
Unlike Europe, Asia never produced a comprehensive peace settlement that all major parties accepted. The San Francisco Peace Treaty and the parallel security treaties with the United States created a functioning order, but one that China and Russia regarded as incomplete or illegitimate. Territorial disputes, the status of Taiwan, and the role of US forward presence have remained live issues precisely because the post-war arrangements were never fully consensual.
In this unfinished landscape, historical interpretation becomes strategic. Who counts as a victor, whose suffering is privileged, and which institutions carry the authority of 1945 are questions that map directly onto contemporary contests over hierarchy and influence. The invocation of wartime alliance is therefore less an exercise in nostalgia than an argument about who has the right to write the rules of the regional order.
India’s Distant Gaze
For India’s strategic community, the Pacific and East Asian dimensions of the Second World War have often seemed remote. The war’s impact on the Subcontinent—famine, military mobilisation, the acceleration of political change—is better remembered in social and political history than in contemporary security analysis. As a result, the way Washington, Beijing and Moscow now deploy the memory of 1945 receives relatively little sustained attention in Delhi.
That inattention is becoming harder to sustain. India’s own interests are entangled in the balance of power that emerges from these historical contests. The stability of the Indo-Pacific, the future of US alliances, the management of the Taiwan question, and the terms of major-power coexistence all affect India’s strategic space. Understanding how the principal powers legitimise their claims through the lens of 1945 is part of reading the environment in which Indian policy must operate.
History as Strategic Resource
None of the current invocations is false in every particular. The United States and the Republic of China were allies. The Chinese people endured enormous suffering and contributed to Japan’s defeat. The Soviet Union bore a staggering burden in Europe and played a decisive role in the final stages of the war against Japan. The problem lies not in the facts but in their selective arrangement.
When leaders reach for 1945, they are rarely engaged in disinterested historical inquiry. They are constructing usable pasts—narratives that authorise present ambitions and constrain the claims of rivals. Trump’s references to wartime cooperation with both Russia and China, Xi’s emphasis on China’s victor status, and Moscow’s defence of the Yalta legacy all illustrate the same phenomenon: the past is being mobilised for the contests of the present.
The ghosts of 1945 have not been laid to rest. They are being summoned, interpreted and deployed in the ongoing struggle to define who holds authority in Asia and on what historical grounds. For countries that must navigate this struggle, including India, the task is to recognise the political uses of memory without becoming captive to any single version of it. The war ended eighty years ago. The argument over its meaning continues.
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